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FINDING A REASONABLE WAY TO
ENFORCE THE REASONABLE EFFORTS
REQUIREMENT IN CHILD
PROTECTION CASES
Jeanne M. Kaiser1
Abstract: Under federal law, state child protection agencies
are required to exert ―reasonable efforts‖ to reunite abused and
neglected children with their parents before seeking to
terminate parental rights and free the children for adoption.
The scope of this requirement is undefined in federal statutes
and in the statutory law of many states. As a result, it has
fallen to appellate courts to determine the degree of effort a
state agency must exert before the relationship between a
parent and a child is severed.
This has proven no easy task. By the time a parental
termination case has reached an appellate court, the children
may have been in the care and protection of the state for a
lengthy time and may have developed a bond with foster
parents who are hoping to adopt them. This leaves the
appellate court with a difficult choice if it finds that the efforts
of the state agency have been insufficient or poorly matched to
the needs of the family in question.

1 The author is a member of the appellate panel of the Children and Family
Law program of the Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel Services. She
is also an Assistant Professor of Legal Research and Writing at Western New
England College School of Law, where she teaches a class entitled Child, Family
and State. The author thanks her colleagues Beth Cohen, Giovanna Shay and
Taylor Flynn for their comments on this piece. The author owes a particular
debt to the Legal Writing Institute‘s 2009 scholarship workshop for all the help
she received as a participant.
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Faced with these circumstances, many appellate courts
have simply rubber-stamped the efforts of the state agency
without much review, and in effect read the reasonable efforts
requirement out of existence. Other appellate courts have done
a more exacting examination of whether reasonable efforts
were made. When these courts have found deficiencies, the
almost inevitable effect has been to delay permanency for the
children involved by requiring the agency to go back and make
further attempts at reunification.
After reviewing appellate decisions of both types, this
article concludes that neither approach is satisfactory. The
article offers three ways to alleviate the thorny problems faced
by appellate courts in these difficult cases. First, it contends
that in the absence of a federal definition of reasonable efforts,
states should develop more precise definitions of their own.
Second, it argues that courts make better use of empirical
research when evaluating whether a state agency has made
reasonable efforts, so as to make a more accurate assessment
of whether the state‘s efforts are satisfactory. Finally, it
suggests that state courts discontinue the practice of
considering reasonable efforts as a condition precedent to
termination of parental rights.
The article acknowledges that these approaches singly or in
combination will not completely resolve the issues raised by
reasonable efforts cases, but asserts they will help ease the
problems created by those difficult cases.
As an attorney who serves as appellate counsel for
individuals in Massachusetts whose parental rights have been
terminated, I have been quite surprised by the near universal
failure of the ―reasonable efforts‖ defense to the termination of
those rights. In Massachusetts, as in almost every other state in
the union,2 the state child protection agency is required to show
that it used reasonable efforts, both to prevent the removal of

Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State‘s
Burden Under Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT‘L L.J. 259,
293 & n.167 (2003).
2
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children from their homes, and to reunite them with their
families.3
The reasonable efforts requirement is consistent with the
basic underpinnings of care and protection law. At the federal
level, Congress requires states to use reasonable efforts to
preserve families or forego federal funding for their child
protection programs.4 In my own state, preservation of the
biological family is cited as a fundamental purpose in the first
section of the governing statute,5 and the state‘s departmental
regulations require that it try to preserve the family unit in the
course of carrying out its protective duties.6 In addition, there
has long been a common law requirement in Massachusetts that
the Department of Children and Families (the Department)
establish that it tried to correct the conditions that led to its
involvement before seeking to terminate parental rights.7
Massachusetts, like a number of other states, codified the
reasonable efforts requirement in 1984, in response to the
federal mandate.8

3

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 26(b), 29C (2008).

4

See infra note 21, and accompanying text; 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15).

5

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 1 (2009). The statute provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this commonwealth
to direct its efforts, first, to the strengthening and
encouragement of family life for the care and protection of
children; to assist and encourage the use by any family of all
available resources to this end; and to provide substitute care
of children only when the family itself or the resources
available to the family are unable to provide the necessary
care and protection to insure [sic] the rights of any child to
sound health and normal physical, mental, spiritual and
moral development.

Id.
110 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.01 (2009) (explaining that the philosophy of the
Department is to exert reasonable effort to keep families intact).
6

7 In re Dep‘t of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 381
N.E.2d 565, 571 (Mass. 1978).
8

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2008) (effective July 12, 1984).
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In view of this legal landscape, I expected that the
Department‘s efforts to keep children in their homes would be
scrutinized carefully by appellate courts reviewing judgments
terminating parental rights and/or placing children in the care
and protection of the Department. However, after repeatedly
having little success with my own ―reasonable efforts‖
arguments on behalf of parents, I decided to explore the issue in
more depth.
My exploration revealed a fundamental
predicament for appellate courts reviewing reasonable efforts
cases. It is extraordinarily difficult to simultaneously hold the
state to its obligation to use reasonable efforts to keep a family
together and preserve permanency and stability for children.
A review of appellate decisions on reasonable efforts revealed
that cases are rarely overturned on the grounds that the state
has not done enough to try to reunite parents with their
children. The practical reasons for this outcome are abundantly
clear. When the appellate court of any state reverses a decision
of a trial court in a care and protection or adoption case it may
also be reversing years of work to obtain permanency, safety,
and emotional well-being for children who are parties to the
case. This is a hard path for an appellate court to take even
when faced with lackluster, or downright hostile, attitudes
towards reunification by the state. In essence, courts are aware
that a decision enforcing the state‘s obligation to comply with
the law may also upset stability for a child who has been
previously neglected or abused. In such circumstances, courts
may find it easier to rule that reasonable efforts need only mean
meager or pro-forma efforts.
Such a results-driven approach has its own substantial
drawbacks. If an appellate court always finds that the efforts
made by the state are good enough, what motivation is there for
the state to comply with its obligations in this regard? Indeed,
my observation is that many service plans developed for parents
who have children in the Massachusetts child protection system
have a decidedly perfunctory feel to them. They routinely
contain a mix of parenting classes, anger management
workshops, and individual therapy, which when looked at in the
context of the needs of the parents involved, appear to have little
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to no chance of providing any actual help.9 Consistent judicial
approval of these sorts of efforts certainly does little to
encourage the state to exercise more creativity or vigor in
carrying out its reunification efforts.
Moreover, there are unfortunate secondary effects to this
approach. A judicial preference for preserving stability for
children over enforcing the reasonable efforts requirement may
benefit the children involved in a particular case, but be a
detriment to children in state custody as a whole. The
reasonable efforts requirement is born out of a policy decision at
both the state and federal level that children do best when raised
by their family of origin and that the family unit should be
preserved.10
Regular disregard of the reasonable efforts
requirement, however well-intentioned or inadvertent, hardly
furthers this goal.11
This article explores the question of whether the goals of
enforcing the reasonable efforts requirement and preserving
stability for children can be reconciled. Part I traces the origin
of the reasonable efforts requirement in state and federal child
protection law. Part II.A examines state law cases, of which
Massachusetts is a typical example, that have elevated concerns
about permanency for children over rigorous enforcement of the
requirement.
Part II.B examines decisions from other
jurisdictions that have held the state to a higher standard, while
at the same time creating an unacceptably high risk to the
children involved.
Finally, Part III investigates some
approaches that might alleviate, although not completely

See Crossley, supra note 2, at 305 (criticizing the use of ―boilerplate‖
service plans ―unrelated to the conditions that gave rise to intervention‖).
9

10 This is not an unsubstantiated concern. There is significant evidence that
separating children from their families, even when the families have significant
defects, can be psychologically devastating to the children. Nell Clement, Note,
Do ―Reasonable Efforts‖ Require Cultural Competence? The Importance of
Culturally Competent Reunification Services in the California Child Welfare
System, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 397, 418-19 & nn.135-42 (2008).

Indeed, one author has concluded that the law governing reasonable
efforts is a ―hollow requirement‖ and a ―dead letter.‖ Crossley, supra note 2, at
312.
11
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resolve, the clash between enforcement of the reasonable efforts
requirement and preserving stability and safety for children.

I. ORIGIN OF THE REASONABLE EFFORTS
REQUIREMENT
There has long been a tension between whether the natural
family or substitute caretakers are the best way to care for
abused and neglected children. At times, child protection
experts have taken the position that children should be
permanently severed from abusive and neglectful homes and
placed with new families without much regard for the children‘s
biological parents.12 However, this approach is not only
controversial on child development and child psychology
grounds, it has constitutional problems. The routine or
automatic removal of children from their families cannot meet
constitutional standards set forth in a series of United States
Supreme Court cases. These cases hold that parents have a
constitutional right to raise their children as they see fit without
interference from the state.13 This right was specifically applied
to the care and protection setting in 1982 when the Court
decided Santosky v. Kramer.14 There, the Court determined
that the state could not terminate parental rights without a
finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent was
unfit.15
Nonetheless, this right is tempered by the state‘s parens
patriae interest in protecting the health and welfare of

12 Robert F. Kelly, New Perspectives on Child Protection, Family
Preservation and Reunification Programs in Child Protection Cases:
Effectiveness, Best Practices, and Implications for Legal Representation,
Judicial Practice, and Public Policy, 34 FAM. L. Q. 359, 359 (2000).
13 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc‘y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (stating
that parents have constitutional liberty interest in choosing to enroll child in
parochial school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (identifying
liberty interest in child-rearing choices).
14

455 U.S. 745 (1982).

15

Id. at 769.
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children.16 At times, the prevailing view has been that it is best
to freely exercise this power to separate children from allegedly
unfit parents as quickly and cleanly as possible. At other times,
the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction. 17 At these
times, child protection experts have been more concerned about
the problems inherent in separating children from not just the
biological parents they love, but their communities, and perhaps
their racial, ethnic or religious identities as well, and
consequently fought to keep families together.18 Unfortunately,
these efforts sometimes resulted in children returning, time and
again, to parents who were utterly incapable of caring for them
safely.19 At other times, it led to ―foster care drift,‖ wherein the
child would be placed with a series of foster families in lieu of a

16

Id. at 766-67.

See Patricia A. Schene, Past, Present, and Future Roles of Child
Protective Services, 8:1 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, 23 (1988), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/08_01_FullJou
rnal.pdf. Schene asserts that this battle has been going on for a long time. She
writes:
17

The history of the nation‘s response to child abuse and
neglect has been marked by a tension between two missions:
an emphasis on rescuing children from abusive or neglectful
families on the one hand, and efforts to support and preserve
their families on the other. The contemporary debate over
the priority given to these competing goals, waged in the
press and in scholarly journals, is actually more than 100
years old.
Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
18 See Kelly, supra note 12, at 359; see also Clement, supra note 10, at 418
(focusing on the problems created by separating children from their
backgrounds contending, ―[r]emoval of children from their families and cultural
community has potentially devastating effects on the identity and psychological
health of the removed children.‖).

See Michele Ingrassia & John McCormick, Why Leave Children with Bad
Parents?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 25, 1994, at 52 (outlining a series of what the
authors viewed as egregious errors by child welfare officials who left children
with their families with disastrous consequences). See generally Elizabeth
Bartholet, NOBODY‘S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE
ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999).
19
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pre-adoptive family who would be willing to care for the child
permanently.20
The competing fears about each end of the separationreunification spectrum serve as background to the reasonable
efforts requirement.
First, the concern about separating
children from their biological parents too precipitously led
states to require reunification efforts in their common-law
decisions and then eventually to codification in federal child
welfare statutes. However, by limiting the state‘s responsibility
to exerting only ―reasonable‖ efforts, the government addressed
concerns about foster care drift and lack of permanence for
children that can result from parents being given multiple
―second‖ chances.
While many states already had common-law or statutory
requirements that child protective agencies attempt to keep
families together, the reasonable efforts requirement was first
included in federal law in 1980.21 The Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act (AACWA) required states to exercise
reasonable efforts at points in the child protection process.
Specifically, the AACWA required that ―in each case, reasonable
efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in
foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the
child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to
return to his home.‖22 Thus, under the statute, reasonable
efforts were required first to prevent a child‘s removal from the
home and then to make it possible for him or her to return
home.23

20

Bartholet, supra note 19, at 241.

Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, §
101(a)(1), 94 Stat. 500, 503 (1980). This provision of the reasonable efforts
requirement was preserved when Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe
Families Act in 1997. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2009).
21

22 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §
671(a)(15).

The reasonable efforts requirement, along with other provisions of the
AACWA, was intended to eliminate the unintended consequence of promoting
foster care placement that resulted from previous federal legislation. Under the
previous legislation, states received federal reimbursement for foster care
placements, but not federal financial aid for providing reunification or adoption
services. The AACWA, thus transformed the federal role from a ―relatively
23
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One goal of the AACWA was to discourage states from
looking at removal of children from their homes as both a first
and last resort. The legislation instead sought to encourage
states to provide families with the services they needed to
remain intact and functional.24 One likely motivation for this
goal was the explosion in foster care placements, which rose
from 8,000 to 100,000 during the ten-year period prior to
enactment of the AACWA.25
However laudable this goal, following the enactment of the
AACWA, the pendulum swung away from the goal of family
reunification back to the goals of achieving permanency and
avoiding foster care drift. At least one commentator posits that
the primary reason for the swing was a series of high profile
news reports of horrific child abuse that rightly or wrongly were
blamed in part on the reasonable efforts requirement of the
AACWA.26
As a consequence, the reasonable efforts
requirement was limited in the Adoption and Safe Families Act
of 1997 (ASFA).27 Perhaps the most fundamental change was
simple bill payment for foster care into a system of requirements that
encouraged states to focus on services aimed at preserving families and
achieving permanency for children.‖ Crossley, supra note 2, at 270.
See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 § 103, 94 Stat. at
519 (codified at 42 U.S. C. § 625(a)(1) (2006)) (enumerating ―preventing the
unnecessary separation of children from their families by identifying family
problems, assisting families in resolving their problems, and preventing
breakup of the family where the prevention of child removal is desirable and
possible‖ as one of the purposes of child welfare programs).
24

25 See Shawn L. Raymond, Where Are the Reasonable Efforts to Enforce
the Reasonable Efforts Requirement?: Monitoring State Compliance Under the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1235
(1999).
26 Crossley, supra note 2, at 273-82. According to Crossley, the vagueness
of the reasonable efforts requirement in the AACWA led child protection
caseworkers to believe that their hands were tied when faced with parents who
endangered their children. Id. at 273-78. See also Cristine H. Kim, Note,
Putting Reason Back into the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Child Abuse
and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287, 294-96 (placing the blame for a
number of appalling child abuse and neglect cases on the AACWA; calling them
―reunification murders‖) (citations omitted).
27 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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that the legislation provided that the child‘s ―health and safety‖
are the ―paramount concern‖ for a judge determining whether
reasonable efforts had been made.28 Thus, for the first time, the
question of whether the state had utilized reasonable efforts was
explicitly linked to the child‘s safety. Given this new emphasis,
states might well feel free to be less aggressive with the services
they offer to families, knowing that the primary consideration
for a judge will be not the strength of their efforts, but the health
and safety of the child.29
In addition, under the ASFA, states did not have to exercise
reasonable efforts to keep children in their homes when certain
enumerated conditions were met.30 The ASFA also enacted
timetables governing how long a child could be in foster care
before the state was required to file a petition for termination of
parental rights.31 In these ways, Congress tacitly limited the
amount of time state child welfare agencies were required to
dedicate to trying to preserve the family.32

28

42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (2009).

The evidence is that this indeed has been the case at least with regard to
incorporating this standard into statutory law. According to one author, twothirds of the states have incorporated into their child protection statutes the
paramount nature of the health and safety of the child in the calculation of
whether reasonable efforts have been made. See Crossley, supra note 2, at 294.
29

30 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D). The ASFA excuses reasonable efforts when the
parents‘ behavior has been particularly deplorable. These circumstances
include when (1) the child has been abandoned; (2) the parental rights were
involuntarily terminated (3) the parent has been convicted of murder or
voluntary manslaughter of another of their children or aiding or abetting in that
crime; (4) the parent has been convicted of assault or another crime that results
in serious injury to the child or another of parent‘s children; (5) the parent has
subjected the child to aggravating circumstances including the murder of
another parent in front of the child, subjecting the child or other children in the
home to sexual abuse or other conduct of a severe and repetitive nature that
subjects the child to physical or emotional abuse. Id.
31

42 U.S.C. § 671 (5)(C).

Although the ASFA significantly modified the reasonable efforts
requirement, its effect on the states is uncertain. Crossley noted that many state
statutes appear to be emphasizing child safety and permanency while
deemphasizing reunification services in the wake of the ASFA. Crossley, supra
note 2, at 294. Furthermore, another commentator views the ASFA as changing
a presumption that reunification is in the best interests of the child to a
32

109

Fall 2009

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 7:1

A number of factors have led to uneven treatment of the
reasonable efforts requirement in the states. First, neither the
AACWA nor the ASFA defined the reasonable efforts
requirement. Second, under both statutes, the penalty to states
for failure to comply with the requirement is to risk losing
federal matching funds for their child protection programs.33
This has proven to be an idle threat. Strict monitoring of
compliance and denial of matching funds has rarely, if ever,
occurred.34 Finally, the United States Supreme Court has
determined there is no private right of action to enforce the
reasonable efforts requirement.35 The combination of these
factors means that states can essentially enforce the reasonable
efforts requirement as rigorously or as loosely as they see fit.36

presumption that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the
child if reunification cannot be accomplished within fifteen months. See
Clement, supra note 10, at 397.
On the other hand, according to another commentator, most state courts
did not vary their approach to the interpretation of the reasonable efforts
requirement after the ASFA was passed. See Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable
Efforts: What State Courts Think, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 321, 324 (2005). I have
noted that neither the AACWA nor the ASFA is mentioned in Massachusetts
cases with any frequency, nor is there any indication in its judicial decisions that
the change in the federal law has effected a change in the view of what
constitutes reasonable efforts under Massachusetts law.
33

42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15).

See generally Raymond, supra note 25. See also Crossley, supra note 2,
at 286-87 (commenting that federal funding is rarely withheld, leaving states to
enforce the reasonable efforts requirement in any way they choose).
34

35

Suter v. Artist, 503 U.S. 347, 364 (1992).

36 State practices, at least to some extent, encourage a loose approach.
Many states have pre-printed forms where judges can simply check off a box to
fulfill their obligations to certify that reasonable efforts were made to prevent
removal. Crossley, supra note 2, at 285. As Crossley notes, ―[c]hecking a box
on a pre-printed form . . . does not foster a hearing conducive to the
individualized determinations that [the statute] had contemplated.‖ Id.
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II. THE THORNY PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF THE REASONABLE EFFORTS REQUIREMENT
IN THE STATE COURTS
A. LOOSE ENFORCEMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT
Massachusetts serves as one example of a state in which
judicial enforcement of the reasonable efforts requirement has
been forgiving of uninspired state efforts. At first glance, this is
an unexpected result. Although neither the ACCWA nor the
ASFA required states to incorporate the reasonable efforts
requirement into their statutory law,37 Massachusetts was one of
the states that chose to integrate the language of the federal
statute into its own child protection scheme.38 By adopting the
federal language as its own, the Massachusetts legislature
apparently intended to impose an obligation that can be relied
upon by parents and children aggrieved of the state‘s efforts in
its child protection system. This was not really a substantial
change in the law; common-law decisions in Massachusetts had
consistently cited the need for the Department to work with
parents towards reunification before termination of parental
rights could take place.39
However, Massachusetts appellate courts have set the bar for
complying with the reasonable efforts requirement quite low,
rarely deciding that the state has not met its obligation.40
37

42 U.S.C § 671(a).

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 24, 29C (2008). In addition to these
explicit references to the reasonable efforts requirement, the Massachusetts
statute governing termination of parental rights essentially incorporates the
reasonable efforts requirement when setting forth the circumstances the court
must consider when terminating parental rights. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210,
§ 3(c) (2008).
38

39 See In re Dep‘t of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption,
381 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 1978).

Massachusetts appellate cases reversing judgments against parents on
the basis of failure to exercise reasonable efforts are difficult to find. In one
case, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed a judgment terminating a
father‘s parental rights in part because the Department had done little to help
the father find appropriate housing for him to care for the children. In re
Elaine, 764 N.E.2d 917, 922 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). The court found that the
40
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Viewed from a results-oriented perspective, the advantages of
this approach are clear. By the time a parent‘s rights are
terminated, a child may have been in foster care or a preadoptive home for many months, if not years. The children may
well have a stronger bond with the substitute caretaker by this
point than they have with their biological parents. Moreover, it
may appear to an appellate court that the biological parents in
question are so impaired by drugs, disability, violent disposition
or character flaws that no amount of effort by the state agency is
likely to make a sizeable difference in their ability to care for
their children.
Compounding the problem, an appellate court faced with a
lackluster effort to preserve the family by the state agency has
only unattractive options at its disposal. It could reverse the
judgment of termination and remand to the trial court,
essentially giving both the agency and the biological parents
another opportunity to make the family work. However, taking
this option could wreak disaster on the life of a young child. The
child might be separated from foster parents with whom he or
she has a warm attachment. Pre-adoptive families may decide
they are not patient or flexible enough to put their plans on hold
until the child‘s family falls apart again. Most worrying, the
child may be subjected to additional abuse or neglect despite the
best efforts of the state agency.
Given all of this, the lax enforcement of the reasonable
efforts requirement by the Massachusetts courts is both
practical and predictable. However, a review of Massachusetts
appellate decisions related to the reasonable efforts requirement
Department‘s efforts, which amounted to giving the father ―a list of places to
call,‖ were insufficient, especially given that it did not contact him until several
days before filing a petition to terminate his parental rights. Id. However, in
this case, there was very little evidence of the father‘s unfitness to uphold the
judgment of termination, no matter what the Department‘s efforts. In an
unpublished decision, the Appeals Court considered reasonable efforts to be a
factor when it reversed a judgment of termination. In re Talbot, No. 01-P-1831,
2002 WL 31455226, at *2 (Mass App. Ct. Nov. 4, 2002). In that case, the court
reversed because the trial judge relied on stale information and because the
Department offered the mother a ―paucity of services‖ in the face of her
repeated requests for help from the Department. Id. at *1. Beyond these two
cases, there do not appear to be instances where a judgment of termination was
overturned by an appellate court on the ground that the Department did not use
reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
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reveals an essential lack of connection between what the court
says is the law and what the court is willing to enforce as the
law. Massachusetts appellate decisions continually stress that
heroic efforts to preserve the family are not required.41 This
raises no concern; state and federal statutes only require a
reasonable effort. What does raise a concern is the amount of
effort that the appellate courts are willing to view as reasonable.
The appellate courts have often excused decidedly non-heroic
efforts by the Department as good enough to meet its standards,
especially when a failure to so find would undo the placement of
the child.
For instance, in Adoption of Gregory,42 one of the first postAACWA cases to address the reasonable efforts requirement, the
state, working through a private agency, could hardly have done
less to reunify the family in question. It made no efforts
whatsoever to reunite the children with their parents for the first
twenty months after they were removed from their custody.43
Thereafter, it informed the institution where the children had
been placed that reunification with the parents was a possibility
and that therefore the facility should try to work with them.44 At
that point, the institution set up meetings with the parents to
discuss their parenting problems, encouraged them to
participate in services in the community and set up a visitation
schedule. The agency‘s own efforts were limited to drawing up a
service plan for the parents that identified the tasks the parents
needed to complete before reunification could occur.45
Despite these sparse efforts by the agency, the Massachusetts
Appeals Court gave short shrift to the parents‘ argument that the
Department failed to work to reunify them with the children.
The court‘s direct discussion of reasonable efforts was relegated

41 See, e.g., Adoption of Lenore, 770 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002);
Adoption of Abigail, 499 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
42

See 501 N.E.2d 1179 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).

43

Id. at 1180-81.

44

Id. at 1181.

45

Id.

113

Fall 2009

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 7:1

to a short paragraph at the end of the decision.46 There, the
court made clear its view that it was the parents‘ failings, and
not the Department‘s, that made reunification impossible,
noting that the parents did not consistently take advantage of
those services that were offered.47 More tellingly, the court
focused on the children‘s fragile emotional state and their bond
with pre-adoptive parents in deciding to uphold the decision to
terminate parental rights.48 The court determined that while
the Department may have failed to follow its own regulations,
―the breach was not such as to call for a present remedy,‖49 thus
indicating that it was far more concerned with the practical
result of a reversal of the termination decision on the children
than whether the Department fulfilled its statutory obligation to
use reasonable efforts to reunify.50
The Appeals Court has also consistently excused the
Department from making any effort to preserve the family when
a post-hoc examination of the case permits the conclusion that

46 Id. at 1186. The parents premised their claim on chapter 119, section 1 of
the General Laws of Massachusetts which stresses the goal of ―strengthening
and encouragement of family life,‖ as well as regulations that required the
Department to develop service plans for the parents. Id.
47

Adoption of Gregory, 501 N.E.2d at 1186.

48

Id. at 1183.

49

Id. at 1186.

50 Other jurisdictions have taken a similar approach when faced with
desultory efforts by their state child protection agency. For instance, the New
Mexico Appeals Court expressed concern that despite all parties‘ agreement that
a mother should obtain an evaluation that would permit her to receive a referral
to parent-child therapy that was deemed necessary to reunification, she was
unable to obtain the expert evaluation she needed to obtain a therapy referral.
State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep‘t, 47 P.3d 859 (N.M. Ct. App.
2002). In that case, the court commented that the state agency ―simply let
events take their course‖ until ―time became an insurmountable obstacle‖ for
the mother and termination of her parental rights was inevitable. Id. at 866.
The court remarked that it was ―troubled‖ by the state agency‘s actions and that
it believed the state ―agency [could not] be proud‖ of its actions, but found the
reasonable efforts requirement was ―barely satisfied‖ and upheld the judgment
of termination. Id.
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any efforts would have been futile.51 In Adoption of Nicole, for
instance, the court acknowledged that ―it is fair comment that
the [agency charged with working with the father] did not do
much for the father, but it is equally fair comment that [the
agency] had little with which to work.‖52 The court ruled that
because the father was going to be incarcerated for a lengthy
period of time, the Department did not have to ―go through the
motions‖ of providing reunification services when it had already
settled on the plan of adoption.53 The court also noted
―parenthetically‖ that it was unwilling to penalize the child
involved in the case because of mistakes made by the
Department.54 Thus, in this case, the Appeals Court signaled its
view that if forced to choose between strict enforcement of the
reasonable efforts requirement and preserving the placement of
the child, it would choose the latter course.
Massachusetts courts are far from alone in deciding that the state does
not have to make efforts to reunify if those efforts are likely to be futile. See
Bean, supra note 32, at 337-43 (positing that the proliferation of cases finding
that a state agency does not have to go through the motions of attempting to
reunify if such efforts are likely to be fruitless is related to the more constricted
view of reasonable efforts contained in the ASFA). However, at least in
Massachusetts, the futility defense to a reasonable efforts challenge predates the
AFSA. See Adoption of Nicole, 662 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
51

52

662 N.E.2d at 1061.

53 Id. at 1062. See also Adoption of Abigail, 499 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1986) (finding that ―it would have required a high and unreasonable
measure of optimism‖ for the Department to create a specific plan to reunite a
daughter with her mentally retarded mother). The child in Adoption of Abigail
was removed from her mother‘s care sixteen days after her birth. The court
found that the Department fulfilled its obligation to attempt to reunify the
family by allowing the mother to visit the child after the removal. Id. The court
further found that even though there were signs that the mother had made
significant progress in defeating her personal problems in the time between her
daughter‘s birth and the trial, the mother would be unable to meet the special
needs of her child and thus termination of her rights was appropriate. Id. at
1237. Of note in this case is that the child had been placed with a foster family
as a newborn and remained with them for the three and one-half years that it
took for the case to move through trial and appeal. Id. at 1235. Thus, the court
was indirectly posed with the question of whether it should delay and possibly
disrupt adoption of a child who had been with the prospective adoptive parents
since she was a new-born.
54

Adoption of Nicole, 662 N.E.2d at 1062.
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The Appeals Court has also made it clear that the
Department‘s efforts are limited to linking parents to existing
services and that it is not required to fill the gaps in available
services on its own.55 In fact, the Department is not even
required to look very hard for available services and instead can
rely on an expert opinion asserting that there are no services
that would fill a particular need of a parent.56
The Appeals Court has been similarly tolerant of
reunification efforts by the Department that are so poorly
matched to the parent in question as to raise a judicial
eyebrow.57 For instance, in Adoption of Adam, the court
acknowledged that it was ―unusual‖ for a Department case
worker to serve as a ―therapist‖ for a mother seeking
reunification with her son.58 The court nonetheless found that
this service was reasonable because the case worker labored
diligently to help the mother for three years and the mother
found the contact to be beneficial.59 The court did not comment
55 See Adoption of Lenore, 770 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). In
Lenore, the Department referred the parents to a number of services, but their
applications to receive them were rejected. Id.
56 Id. In Lenore, the Appeals Court chided the Department for relying on
the expert‘s testimony that no services were available that would help the
parents to raise their child, rather than investigating the availability of services
itself. The court noted that the Department has the expertise to match parents
and services and that it is obligated to use that expertise and urged that the trial
court must remain ―vigilant‖ in assuring that the Department fulfilled its
obligations. Id. at 503 & n.3. Nonetheless, other than this mild rebuke in the
footnote to a published decision, the Department suffered no consequence for
its failure to use its expertise.
57 A good example of this attitude by the Appeals Court is contained in the
unpublished decision Adoption of Madison, No. 05-P-390, 2005 WL 2861460,
at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 1, 2005). There, the court remarked in a footnote that
―this was not the Department‘s finest hour.‖ Id. at *4 n.5. This was something
of an understatement. Despite the fact that the Department had been involved
with a very needy family for many years, it did not enter a single service plan
that would have established its efforts to preserve the family into the record. Id.
Although clearly disturbed by this apparent failure to fulfill its statutory
obligation, the court found that the Department‘s efforts were reasonable
because the parents had rejected some of the services offered. Id. at *4.
58

Adoption of Adam, 500 N.E.2d. 816, 819 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).

59

Id.
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on the fact that the evidence strongly indicated that serious
psychological problems were the source of the mother‘s
difficulties in raising her son and that generally a Department
case worker will not have the same qualifications or skills as a
trained psychotherapist to deal effectively with these problems.
It also failed to note the possibility that the Department‘s case
worker may well have had an adverse interest to the mother,
given that the Department favored adoption over reunification
as a plan for the child. Indeed, it is hard to see how using such a
poorly matched resource to provide the crucial reunification
service in a particular case could possibly be viewed as a
―reasonable‖ way to effect reunification.60
But perhaps the most potent means the Appeals Court has
used to dispose of the reasonable efforts requirement is to
routinely hold that the Department‘s obligation to offer services
is contingent on the parents fulfilling their own obligations to
work towards reunification.61 In these cases, the court‘s
discussion has focused on the unreasonableness of the parents‘
efforts as opposed to an evaluation of whether the Department
has acted reasonably.62 Whatever the initial appeal of this

60 For an example of similar acceptance of poorly matched services in
another jurisdiction, see In re Charles A., 738 A.2d 222 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
In this case, the trial court had heavily criticized the state Department of
Children and Families for failing to recognize that the mother was not abusing
her children, but rather, like the children, was a victim of her husband‘s abuse.
The trial court found that the department had violated its own regulations with
regard to the mother‘s situation and even took some responsibility upon itself
for failing to appoint separate counsel to represent the mother. Id. at 223.
Nonetheless, the trial court found that the mother had refused some of services
proffered by the department and that therefore reasonable efforts to reunify her
with the children were made. Id. at 224. The Appeals Court upheld this
determination. Id.
61 See, e.g., Adoption of Mario, 686 N.E.2d 1061 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997);
Adoption of Serge, 750 N.E.2d 498 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001); Adoption of Eduardo,
782 N.E.2d. 551 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). Other states also judge the state‘s
efforts in conjunction with the parents‘ efforts or lack thereof. See, e.g., In re
Guardianship of D.M.H., 736 A.2d 1261, 1274 (N.J. 1999); In re Jason L., 810
A.2d 765, 767 (R.I. 2002); In re M.B., 595 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Iowa Ct. App.
1999).
62 See, e.g., Adoption of Mario, 686 N.E.2d. at 1066; Adoption of Serge, 750
N.E.2d. at 504.
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approach, there are at least two problems with its application.
First, nothing in the Massachusetts statutes governing
reasonable efforts, or the federal law those statutes are modeled
upon, suggests that the Department‘s obligation is excused if the
parents do not show initiative themselves. Thus, the Appeals
Court interpretation creates an exception to the reasonable
efforts requirement that is absent from the plain language of the
statute.
Perhaps more importantly, this approach ignores a
fundamental aspect of care and protection cases in general and
the reasonable efforts requirement in particular. The cases
excusing the Department‘s responsibilities on the ground that
the parents have not fulfilled their own obligations catalogue the
failings of the parents in great detail. The average reader, upon
reviewing this litany of parental failures, might well determine
that the parents have forfeited all right to services offered by the
Department because of their bad behavior. However, this
ignores that the Department‘s very existence is premised on the
assumption that it will deal with dysfunctional, disturbed
and/or irresponsible parents. Thus, it seems only fair that the
reasonable efforts requirement be tailored to meet the
propensities of those parents, and not those of the average,
responsible parent who might be expected to eagerly accept
available services.
In short, the clientele served by the
Department would seem to need extra measures of outreach,
patience and aggressiveness to successfully link to services. In
view of this dynamic, excusing the Department from any
obligation at all if the parents do not show initiative in engaging
in services is both counter-intuitive and unfairly shifts the
burden to the parents.63
This unfairness is particularly problematic when parents
suffer from a disability such as mental illness or mental
retardation. The decisions of the Massachusetts appellate courts

63 Some states have noted this problem in reviewing their own reasonable
efforts cases. The Connecticut Appellate Court, for instance, quoted New York‘s
highest court with approval, stating ―the parent is by definition saddled with
problems: economic, physical, sociological, psychiatric or any combination
thereof. The agency, in contrast, is vested with expertise, experience, capital,
manpower and prestige.‖ In re Eden F., 710 A.2d 771, 783 (Conn. App. Ct.
1998) (quoting In re Sheila G., 462 N.E.2d 1139, 1145 (N.Y. 1984)).
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send a contradictory message on what constitutes reasonable
efforts in these cases. On the one hand, these decisions have
stressed that the Department has an obligation to tailor services
in order to accommodate the disabilities of parents.64 On the
other hand, no decision has ever found that the Department
failed to fulfill this obligation, no matter what the nature or
severity of the disability involved. 65
This is perhaps most problematic when a parent suffers from
a mental illness. Parents suffering from a serious mental illness
such as schizophrenia or bi-polar disorder present a particular
conundrum with regard to reunification services. One of the
hallmarks of serious mental illness is denial that any problem
exists. Oftentimes, people suffering from schizophrenia, for
example, will be extremely paranoid and delusional while at the
same time vociferously denying that there is anything wrong
with them or that medication is required. Nevertheless, when a
mentally ill parent refuses a Department recommended
psychiatric evaluation or prescribed medication, on the ground
that nothing is wrong with them, the Appeals Court has
generally found that the Department has fulfilled its reasonable
efforts obligation simply by making those services available.66
Moreover, the Appeals Court has found that a parent who
declined those services on the ground she did not need them has
64 See, e.g., Adoption of Gregory, 747 N.E.2d 120, 126 (Mass. 2001)
(reiterating earlier decisions that the Department was required to accommodate
a parent‘s disabilities in provision of services, but held that the American with
Disabilities Act, as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 12131, cannot be used as a defense in
termination of parental rights proceedings).

In Adoption of Gregory, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the
Department sufficiently accommodated a father with cognitive disabilities by
revising its visitation schedule, continuing to use a social worker trained in
cognitive deficits to work with the father beyond the investigation stage, and
referring the parents to a parenting group designed to work with cognitively
limited parents. Id.
65

66 Not all states require that their child protection agencies exert reasonable
efforts to reunite parents suffering from a mental illness with their children.
Indeed, several states have statutes that explicitly exempt the state from this
requirement upon a showing that the parent has a mental disability. See Dale
Margolin, No Chance to Prove Themselves: The Rights of Mentally Disabled
Parents Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and State Law, 15 VA. J.
SOC. POL‘Y & L. 112 (2007).
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waived her claim that the Department failed to accommodate
her disability by not raising the claim at the very time she
refused the services. 67 In essence, such a holding places the
responsibility for recognizing and accepting help for a mental
illness on the parent at the very time the parent is clinically the
least likely to do so. This practice hardly accommodates the
disability. To the contrary, it treats the disability as if it did not
exist and as if the mentally ill parent was equally capable of
taking advantage of services as a parent not so impaired.
In short, at every juncture, the Massachusetts courts have
taken an approach to the reasonable efforts requirement that
minimizes the obligations of the Department and maximizes the
need for difficult and impaired parents to take responsibility for
resolving their own parenting problems before they can attain
reunification with their children. Ultimately, the reason for this
approach appears to be the principle first stated in Adoption of
Gregory, that the failure to exert reasonable efforts is a breach
for which there is no ―present remedy‖68 and the ―parenthetical‖
comment in Adoption of Nicole,69 that the court would not allow
the children involved to be penalized because of the deficiencies
of the Department. In essence, by holding the Department to a
minimal standard, the courts can preserve the placements of the
children of parents who may have been poorly served.
Nonetheless, while it is quite problematic for a state‘s appellate
courts to systematically minimize, or even ignore, the
requirements of state statutory law, along with federal
mandates, the potentially tragic consequences of a more
rigorous approach to the reasonable efforts requirement
approach are easy to see when reviewing decisions from other
states.

See, e.g., Adoption of Eduardo, 782 N.E.2d 551, 555 (Mass. App. Ct.

67

2003).
68

See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.

69

See supra note 54.
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B. STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT
A number of states have applied more exacting standards in
reasonable efforts cases at various points in the past. As a
consequence, the outcomes in those decisions are sometimes
starkly different from those in Massachusetts. For example, in
California, the standard the state must satisfy is by design more
stringent. The California parental rights termination statute
requires the state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
it has used reasonable efforts to reunify the family before it will
permit termination of parental rights.70 One example of a
reasonable efforts case from California suffices to illustrate how
this more stringent standard can have radically different
consequences in the life of a family.
In In re Victoria M.,71 the California Court of Appeal
reversed a judgment terminating the parental rights of a mother
in the following circumstances. The mother had seven children,
none of whom were in her care at the time of the hearing on this
matter.72 The case arose when the mother and three of her
children, two girls and a boy, were about to be evicted from a
motel. All of the children had head lice so severe that their
heads needed to be shaved and the two girls had scabies. The
boy had suffered an accidental burn that needed to be treated by
a skin graft. The donor site for the skin graft had become so
infected due to inadequate care that the skin grew over the
bandage and his ―trousers had to be peeled off‖ to treat the
infection.73

70 CAL. WELF & INST. CODE § 361.5(b) (West 2008). Connecticut has a
similar requirement of clear and convincing evidence. Crossley, supra note 2, at
301 nn.210-11. This is a requirement these states have imposed upon
themselves. Proof by clear and convincing evidence of a parent‘s unfitness is
constitutionally required. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. However, most states
have not required that same burden of proof with regard to the reasonable
efforts requirement. The Massachusetts courts have not spoken to the burden
of proof with regard to reasonable efforts.
71

255 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).

72

Id. at 500.

73

Id.
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The mother was mentally retarded and had a poor history
with social service providers. In fact, one agency refused to
work with her anymore because of her excessive use of
services.74 After the children were removed from her care, the
mother was instructed to participate in numerous services and
to meet certain goals such as obtaining appropriate housing and
acting appropriately during visitation.75 Although the mother
actively participated in most of the services offered to her;
because of her borderline IQ, she had difficulty benefitting from
the services. The service providers uniformly proffered a poor
prognosis for her ability to adequately parent the children.76
She visited with the children regularly, although not as often as
her service plan allowed. Furthermore, during the visits she had
difficulty controlling all three children at the same time and the
arrangements had to be revised so she could visit with the boy
alone. At the time of the appellate decision, the girls, who had
been in state custody for three years, were living with foster
parents who were willing to adopt them. The prognosis for the
boy was bleaker. Service providers predicted he would need
institutional care because of his own disabilities.77
On appeal, the California court accepted the mother‘s
argument that the state did not prove by clear and convincing
evidence that it had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with
her children. The court found that the services offered were not
specifically tailored to address the mother‘s limited intellectual
abilities.78 The court also criticized the state for not being more
proactive in its efforts to assist the mother in obtaining housing,
and expecting instead that the mother find housing on her very
limited income by herself.79 The court reached this conclusion
even though the mother‘s counselor in her parenting class

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id. at 501.

77

In re Victoria M., 255 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).

78

Id. at 504-05.

79

Id. at 504.
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recognized her limitations but found that she was unable, even
after three attempts, to understand the material in the classes or
integrate them into her parenting style. The court was also
unimpressed that the mother eventually became a client at an
agency that specialized in working with mentally retarded
individuals because the state had referred her to the agency
because of her son‘s needs and not her own.80 In short, because
the state had failed to tailor its efforts to the mother‘s mental
disabilities, the judgment of termination was reversed, creating
the possibility that the children would be returned to the
mother‘s care and guaranteeing that a permanent solution to
their care and custody would be delayed. Conversely, a
Massachusetts court reviewing similar facts would likely find
that further efforts would be futile; or that the mother had not
sufficiently cooperated in services herself; or that no services
capable of curing the mother‘s parental deficiencies were
available.81
Although other states do not share California‘s requirement
of clear and convincing evidence with regard to reasonable
efforts, some states share the concern about closely matching
services to the parental needs. For instance, in an Oregon case,

80

Id.

81 See supra Part II.A. In contrast, California courts have continued to
strictly enforce the reasonable efforts requirement in recent years. For instance,
in one case it found that reasonable efforts had not been made when a series of
logistical problems, most of which related to the maternal grandmother who
was caring for the child, led to a delay in counseling services. In re Alvin R., 134
Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 216-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). In another case, the appellate
court delayed the permanent placement of a child who had been in state custody
since he was four days old because the state agency could not show that it
provided services to the child‘s mother, who suffered from a serious mental
illness. In re Daniel G., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 78-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
Nonetheless, California‘s approach to the reasonable efforts requirement is
somewhat schizophrenic. While the cases discussed here demonstrate that
California has sometimes imposed more stringent requirements on its child
protection agency than other states have imposed on theirs, California has
completely eliminated the requirement in other cases. By statute, California
allows the state to bypass reunification efforts entirely when two experts testify
that the parent has a mental disability that renders him or her incapable of
benefiting from those efforts. See Nina Wasow, Planned Failure: California‘s
Denial of Reunification Services to Parents with Mental Disabilities, 31 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 183-84 (2006).
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the court reversed a judgment terminating a mentally ill
mother‘s parental rights to her young child. The court found
that the newborn had been ―dumped in her mother‘s lap‖
without any immediate provision for the mother‘s considerable
needs for mental health treatment. The court acknowledged
that the child had formed a very real bond with foster parents
during eighteen months of foster care and that it was troubling
to break this bond to allow the mother another opportunity to
raise her child. Nonetheless, the court decided to take this
route.82
Similarly, a New York appellate court reversed a judgment of
termination of the parental rights of a mother who had been
found wandering with her infant children.83 The court found
the state failed to use reasonable efforts because it did nothing
to monitor the mother‘s outpatient treatment or link her with
services after her discharge from the hospital. The court made
this decision even though there was significant evidence that the
mother would not have complied with mental health services
even if the state had done more.84 The court found that it would
be improper to speculate on whether the mother would have
participated in services had they been offered and provided the
mother with another chance to raise her children. 85 The most
remarkable thing about this case is that the children had been in
foster care for ten years at the time of the decision; the mother
had visited with the children infrequently, and at least at some
points her proposed plan for the children was that they stay in
foster care until they were ready for college.86 Thus, it seems

82 See State ex rel. Juvenile Dep‘t of Multnomah County v. Habas, 700 P.2d
225, 230-31 (Or. 1985) (noting that failure to use reasonable efforts was not the
sole reason for reversal in this case, as the court was also concerned about the
state‘s failure to satisfy statutory pleading requirements).
83

In re Star A., 435 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1982).

84 The dissent asserted that the state would have needed to make
―relentless‖ efforts to assure the mother remained linked with services. Id. at
1085 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
85

Id. at 1083.
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fair to say that in this case, the court elevated the need to
enforce the reasonable efforts requirements over the needs of
the children for permanency.
In short, it is painful to contemplate the consequences of
judicial decisions such as these, which strictly enforce the
reasonable efforts requirement. When appellate courts take this
approach, permanent placement for the children is delayed
while the state again attempts to match the parents with services
that satisfactorily demonstrate reasonable efforts. Indeed, the
courts‘ decisions in these cases might well result in children
being subjected to another round of upheavals in their living
situations, shuttling between natural parent and foster or preadoptive parent. This is a disheartening result. As the Iowa
Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, ―[t]he crucial days of
childhood cannot be suspended.‖87
Nonetheless, the lax treatment of the reasonable efforts
requirement described in Part B above is also seriously flawed.
So what is an appellate judge faced with unimpressive efforts
towards reunification to do? Is the judge truly provided only
with the Hobson‘s choice of deciding between ratifying
inadequate efforts by the state and delaying permanency and
stability for abused and neglected children? The remainder of
this article will focus on possible alternative approaches to this
problem that would help avoid the quandary currently faced by
appellate judges in these cases.

III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE REASONABLE
EFFORTS CONUNDRUM
A. MORE PRECISE DEFINITION OF THE REASONABLE
EFFORTS REQUIREMENT
One possible solution to the quandary faced by courts
reviewing whether reasonable efforts have been exercised is for
Id. at 1086 (Meyer, J., dissenting). It should be noted that given the new
timeframes contained in ASFA it would be unlikely for a child protection case to
drag on for such a long time without resolution at the present time. See supra
notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
86

87 In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29, 35 (Iowa 2003) (quoting In re A.C., 415
N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987)).
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states to fill the gap created by the failure of Congress to define
reasonable efforts. States can accomplish this goal by providing
a more precise definition themselves. A number of states have
taken this approach and enacted statutes that provide more
direction to their child protection agencies regarding
reunification services.88
For instance, Minnesota has a detailed statute governing
reasonable efforts. It defines reasonable efforts as ―the exercise
of due diligence by the responsible social service agency to use
culturally appropriate and available services to meet the needs
of the child and the child‘s family.‖89 The statute further places
the burden on the state to show that it has exercised reasonable
efforts and requires the juvenile court to make findings of fact
and conclusion of law on the question of reasonable efforts.
Finally, the statute gives the juvenile court specific guidelines to
consider when evaluating the state‘s efforts. The court should
consider whether the services were ―(1) relevant to the safety
and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of
the child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and
accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the
circumstances.‖90
The Minnesota statute also codifies the circumstances under
which reasonable efforts are excused.91 For the most part, this

88 The federal government has attempted to give the states some guidance
in this area. The Federal Children‘s Bureau, a division of the Department of
Health and Human Services, has issued guidelines for states with regard to
reasonable efforts. These guidelines suggest courts use a variety of factors in
determining whether reasonable efforts have been made. These factors include
the specific dangers to the children involved, whether services relate specifically
to the family‘s needs, whether the state agency was diligent in arranging
services, and whether those services were appropriate and timely. Crossley,
supra note 2, at 313.
89 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.012(f) (West 2008). This definition applies
equally to the efforts the state must exert to reunify families and the efforts the
state must exert to provide the child with a permanent placement once it has
determined that reunification with the family of origin is not feasible. See §
260.012(a), (e).
90

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.012 (h).

91

Id.
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section of the statute mirrors the exceptions to the reasonable
efforts requirement set out in the federal statute.92 Additionally,
the statute permits the court to determine that reasonable
efforts are not necessary when they would be futile and
therefore unreasonable under the circumstances.93 Minnesota
thereby accomplishes by statute the practice of excusing states
from ―going through the motions‖ that many state courts have
achieved by their common-law interpretations of the reasonable
efforts requirement.94 While the merits of this approach are
certainly debatable,95 at least Minnesota has stated a legislative
preference for this means of dealing with difficult odds in
reunification cases.
Colorado, likewise, has developed a more comprehensive
definition of reasonable efforts in its statutes. Colorado requires
that each of its counties and cities provides services to families
and children who are in out-of-home placements.96 The statute
further provides that certain services ―shall‖ be available to
families in its care and protection system.97 The statute goes on
to require certain additional services ―based upon the state‘s
capacity to increase federal funding or any other moneys
appropriated.‖98 The enumerated services include concrete
assistance, such as child care, transportation, in-home
homemaker services, and financial services likely to be helpful
to overwhelmed and embattled parents.99 In addition, the
services include mental health, drug and alcohol treatment,

92

Compare id., with 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15).

93

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.012(a)(5).

94

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.

95

See Bean, supra note 32, at 337-43.

96

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-208(1) (West 2008).

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-208(2)(b) (West 2008). These services
include basic services such as screening, assessments and individual case plans,
home based crisis and family counseling, referrals to private and public
resources, visitation and placement, including emergency shelter. Id.
97

98

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-208(2)(d) (West 2008).

99

Id.

127

Fall 2009

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 7:1

presumably to address the problems that are at the root of so
many care and protection cases.100
The benefit of these statutes to an appellate court is clear.
When a state more precisely defines reasonable efforts, the
reviewing court can compare the efforts of the state actually
made in a particular case against the efforts required by the
statute to determine if the state has fulfilled its duty. By
contrast, states that use the term reasonable efforts without
further definition provide no guidance to the appellate court
about how the reasonableness of the efforts is to be measured.
Therefore, in states with a more precise definition of reasonable
efforts, the danger that an appellate court will so significantly
minimize the requirement as to adjudicate it out of existence is
greatly reduced. Whatever one‘s position on the issue of
whether services should be offered in the first place, it cannot be
good practice for a state to establish a requirement in a statute
and then systematically ignore that requirement in judicial
decisions.
A more precise definition is also helpful in states that have
been more demanding in their enforcement of the reasonable
efforts requirement.101 In those states, the reviewing courts may
apply expectations to child protection agencies that are simply
unrealistic given issues such as difficult-to-access services, high
case loads, and uncooperative parents.
When the state
legislature has more specifically defined the reasonable efforts
requirement, appellate courts have some guidance on how to
evaluate the reasonableness of the efforts. Thus, the more
precise definition of reasonable efforts can guard against
unnecessarily prolonging a child‘s drift in the foster care system.
But the greatest value of such legislation is probably at the
front-end of the system - in the child protection agency itself.
More precise definitions of reasonable efforts can be
enormously helpful to front-line workers in state care and
protection services. The challenges faced by these workers
cannot be overstated. Every day they are charged with making
difficult, value-laden decisions about the families torn by
tremendous social and psychological problems.
The
100

Id.

101

See supra Part II.B.
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consequences of making an incorrect decision about a family
can literally be fatal.102 In addition, many of these front-line
workers are undertrained and overworked. In view of these
pressures, vagueness over how much effort they are required to
exert to reunify families only serves to make an already difficult
job nearly impossible. It seems only fair to give these workers,
as well as the families and the courts, statutory guidance on
what constitutes reasonable efforts.
The same considerations also apply to the upper levels of the
child protection system.
Burnout and rapid turnover
consistently plague the highest administrative levels of child
protection systems.103 Often each change in administrators
brings a drastic change in philosophy and clinical priorities for
the department.104 Thus, within a very short period of time, a
state or local child protection system might be headed by
different directors with entirely different views of the reasonable
efforts requirement. This works a great burden on the front-line
staff who must constantly adapt to changes in philosophy in
their daily practice.105
One example suffices to illustrate the difficulties. Social
work professionals can have a reasonable difference of opinion
as to whether parents should be offered concrete services such
as transportation, housekeeping, or financial assistance when
working toward reunification. One valid professional viewpoint
is that providing such services fosters dependence and actually

See Kim, supra note 26, at n.63 (stating that ―[t]here are far too many
deaths to document,‖ but providing details of the deaths of eight children who
died at the hands of their parent/abusers after or during the intervention of a
state child protection agency).
102

Jim Moye & Roberta Rinker, It‘s A Hard Knock Life: Does the Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997 Adequately Address Problems in the Child
Welfare System?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 375, 383 (2002).
103

Id. (referencing a twelve year study by the Urban Institute reporting that
respondents to the study complained that their agencies continually fluctuated
between a philosophy emphasizing family preservation and a philosophy
emphasizing child safety).
104

Id. (noting that such changes in leadership also have an impact on
families in the system who may have come to expect multiple services under one
administration only to have those services withdrawn in another).
105
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discourages parents from taking the lead in attending to their
parental responsibilities. Another equally valid professional
viewpoint is that such concrete services are exactly what parents
need to get their lives back on track and in fact are much more
immediately helpful than any number of anger management or
parenting skills classes.
When a state‘s statutes or regulations spell out at least
generally what services should be included in the reasonable
efforts package, there is no need to revisit this question each
time there is a change at the upper levels of administration.
Instead, front-line workers have a consistent understanding of
what is and is not expected of them. Moreover, providing these
front-line workers with more detail about how the state views
the term ―reasonable efforts,‖ makes it easier for them to know
what to do in the course of attempting to effect reunification.
When this is the case, workers can exert their efforts to
implement actual services as opposed to trying to discern what
exactly they should be doing.
Another advantage of more detailed legislation is that there
is some evidence that the mere act of providing a more precise
definition in the statute leads to more aggressive delivery of
reunification services by state agencies. Although it is difficult
to tell whether this is a direct result of the more precise
definition,106 a review of both Minnesota and Colorado cases
suggests a fairly rigorous approach to reunification efforts in
those states. For instance, in In re Welfare of Children of
S.W.,107 the Minnesota Appeals Court found that the state had
complied with the reasonable efforts requirement when the
mother had received an impressive array of services, including
intensive mental health treatment that involved almost daily
contact with her mental health worker. The worker offered both
concrete assistance in terms of arranging transportation and
setting up appointments, and substantial emotional support.
The mother also received parenting training, psychological

106 At least one commentator has concluded that states that have defined
reasonable efforts have more successfully complied with the obligation to
exercise those efforts. See Crossley, supra note 2, at 313.
107

In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. Ct. App.

2007).
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evaluations, individual therapy and a substantial number of
supervised and unsupervised visitation ultimately totaling three
weekly two-hour visits.108
The court found that this
encompassed all of the services available in the area. 109 In
addition, the agency had extended the deadline for changing the
goal for the children from reunification to adoption in order to
allow the mother time to deal with her serious mental health
problems.110 In short, the efforts of the state in this case seemed
both exhaustive and specifically designed to assist this particular
mother with her individual needs.
Moreover, the Minnesota cases reflect an effort by the state‘s
Department to provide concrete services. For instance, in one
case, the state provided a free bus pass and paid for babysitting
services in order for a mother to attend visits with her children
and school conferences on their behalf and for her to attend
recommended drug treatment programs.111 In another case, the
state provided housekeepers, in-home skills counselor and inhome public health nurses, along with a broad array of
outpatient services in an attempt to cure the parents‘
multifaceted problems dealing with four young children.112 In
each of these cases, the appellate court found reasonable efforts
had been made and that termination of parental rights was
appropriate; however, the broad range, number and aggressive
nature of the services offered in these cases suggest that simply
providing a more comprehensive definition of reasonable efforts

108 Id. at 150. By contrast, this author has observed that the Massachusetts
practice is to provide one-hour of weekly visits for children who are in foster
care when the stated goal remains reunification. This is changed to once
monthly visits for the period of time between the change of goal to adoption and
termination of parental rights by a trial court.
109

Id. at 148.

110

Id. at 150.

In re Welfare of D.T.J., 554 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
There is some evidence that such concrete services are more effective in
facilitating reunification than other, more insight-oriented services. See infra
note 127.
111

112

In re Welfare of A.R.G.-B., 551 N.W.2d 256, 258-59 (Minn. Ct. App.

1996).
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in the state statute serves to motivate the state to take the
requirement more seriously.
This hypothesis is borne out by reviewing decisions in
Colorado. As in Minnesota, the mere existence of detail in the
statute seems to have an effect on the number, type and
intensity of services offered to families. For instance, in one
case, a developmentally disabled mother challenged the state‘s
efforts because the state did not assure that she received services
from a specific agency specializing in serving individuals with
developmental disabilities.113 The Colorado Court of Appeals
found that the reasonable efforts requirement was nonetheless
satisfied because for eleven months the mother received fortyfour hours of weekly in-home family preservations services.
These services included hands-on repetitive instruction about
parenting skills, nutrition, budgeting, and basic life skills. The
family preservation worker and the mother‘s case worker were
aware of her developmental disabilities and adjusted their
services to accommodate issues associated with her problems.
Moreover, the mother ultimately received services from the
agency specializing in developmental disabilities, including
being placed with a host family. Thus, although the mother may
have been disappointed with the outcome, the court‘s
determination that the mother had received sufficient help from
the state seems completely reasonable.114
A comparison of these Minnesota and Colorado decisions
with the decisions examined in Part II of this article seems to
demonstrate some clear advantages to developing a more
precise statutory definition of reasonable efforts.115 As an initial
matter, it appears that when a state statute more specifically
defines reasonable efforts, the state care and protection agency
may do more to attempt reunification. This is advantageous for
several reasons. First, the state‘s efforts may work as intended—
i.e. they might preserve families where permanent removal of

113

People ex rel. J.M., 74 P.3d 475 (Colo. App. 2003).

114

Id. at 477.

Appellate judges in states that have not enacted legislation defining
reasonable efforts might instead be guided by the federal guidelines designed to
assist states in refining the term. See Crossley, supra note 2, at 313.
115
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the children ultimately proves unnecessary. This is a highly
desirable result if one assumes, as federal and state legislation
does, that the best outcome for children is to remain with their
natural families in a safe and healthy environment.
Additionally, reunification preserves the state‘s scarce
resources; because of the high cost of long-term foster care,
effective reunification services that result in children being
returned to their home more quickly are likely much more cost
effective.116 Even if this was not true, no state has an
inexhaustible number of potential adoptive families who are
equipped to handle the substantial emotional challenges of
caring for traumatized children who are not reunified with their
parents.
In short, there seem to be multiple advantages and few
disadvantages to further defining the reasonable efforts
requirement at the state level. While there may be some
concern that more precise definitions might lead to less
flexibility for child protection agencies, the definitions
themselves could be structured to allow for diversity in services.
In fact, a definition that demanded that state child protection
agencies use the best practices and research available at a given
time might serve as an impetus to the further development of
research in the reasonable efforts arena.

B. USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
Although hundreds of reasonable efforts decisions have been
made around the country, I have found none that address the
question of which specific programs have actually proven useful
in reuniting troubled families. Courts rely on logic and intuition
with regard to what services might help families reunite rather
than any empirical proof of efficacy. Thus, it appears that courts
may be ignoring a significant tool that would assist them in
judging whether a state agency has used reasonable efforts to
reunite a family. Certainly, it seems that part of the analysis
should be whether the state is delivering services that have a
proven record of success in child protection cases.

116 See, e.g., Sally K. Christie, Foster Care Reform in New York City: Justice
for All, 36 COLUM J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 33 (2002).
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Nonetheless, this is no easy task. There has been very little
research conducted on the question of the effectiveness of
reunification services.
Indeed, the existing research is
―especially thin, even by child welfare standards.‖117 Moreover,
there are significant problems for judges in evaluating the
quality of such research. Indeed judges attempting to evaluate
research might feel that they are being pulled in opposite
directions depending on what study they are reading.
This difficulty is well illustrated by reviewing research about
a particular program in the related area of family preservation.
The emphasis of a family preservation program differs from
reunification programs because of the point of intervention.
Family preservation programs are designed to intervene in a
family‘s life before the children are removed from the home;
whereas family reunification programs are implemented after a
child has been removed from the home.118 There has been
substantial research about the value of one particular family
preservation program; however, the problem is that the research
itself is very conflicting.
The program at issue is ―Homebuilders,‖ an intensive
intervention model developed in Washington State in the early
1970s.119 Multiple studies of the use of this model have
demonstrated that families who receive ―intensive family
preservation services‖ under this model fare better than families
in a control group.120 However, a federally funded study of five
family preservation programs throughout the country debunked
these findings and determined that families receiving intensive
services were not able to avoid foster-care placement any better

Fred Wulczyn, Family Reunification, 14:1 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 95,
108 (2004), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/14_01_FullJou
rnal.pdf.
117

118

Kelly, supra note 12, at 359.

Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: Tales From the Age of ASFA,
36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 129, 136-37 (2001).
119

120

Id. at 141.
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than families in a control group.121 This study, in turn, was
heavily criticized by a professor at the University of North
Carolina School of Social Work, who concluded that the study
was defective on a number of grounds and therefore
unreliable.122 Given this morass of conflicting evidence, both
trial and appellate court judges might well throw up their hands
and determine that there is little help to be found in social
science research.123
Despite this problem, it may be worthwhile for appellate
court judges to review the evidence related to the reunification
programs because there is some consistency with regard to the
evidence. First, if nothing else, research has been able to
identify characteristics of families most likely to benefit from
reunification services. Specifically, reunification has been more
successful with older children than younger children. 124
Moreover, families with multiple problems, or with children
who have disabilities or serious emotional problems, are more
difficult to reunify.125 Different appellate judges may find this
information enlightening for entirely different reasons. For
121 Westat et al., Evaluation of Family Preservation and Reunification
Programs: Final Report (Dec. 2002), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/evalfampres94/Final/Vol1/index.htm.
122

Wexler, supra note 119, at 142-43.

Robert Kelly, who has studied the efficacy of family reunification
programs, has along with a co-author, attempted to provide some assistance in
assessing the validity of social science research to judges. See Robert F. Kelly &
Sarah H. Ramsey, Assessing and Communicating Social Science Information in
Family and Child Judicial Settings: Standards for Judges and Allied
Professionals, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 22 (2007); Robert F. Kelly & Sarah H. Ramsey,
Assessing Social Science Studies: Eleven Tips for Judges and Lawyers, 40
FAM. L.Q. 367 (2006). Both of these articles illustrate that unless a judge is
thoroughly educated in research methods and statistics, it is a daunting task to
evaluate the complexities of social science research.
123

See Kelly, supra note 12, at 384. Kelly‘s work attempted to provide ―a
systematic review and synthesis of findings of evaluations of [family
reunification programs] with the goal of developing a social science knowledge
base for child protection legal practitioners (judges, court professional staff, and
attorneys representing parents, children, and human services agencies).‖ Id. at
360-61.
124

125

See id. at 385; Wulczyn, supra note 117, at 99-100.

135

Fall 2009

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 7:1

instance, in one state, appellate courts may determine that fewer
efforts should be required when a state agency is attempting to
reunify a very young disabled child with parents who have
multiple problems because reunification is less likely to be
successful in the end. Or, a state‘s appellate courts could take
the contrary view that the state must be much more aggressive
when faced with such families and not limit itself to the steps
taken when attempting to reunify an older, non-disabled child
with parents who have fewer problems. Nonetheless, a court
charged with evaluating reasonable efforts could certainly
benefit from having this information about the relative difficulty
of reuniting certain types of families in order to make an
informed evaluation of whether the state has done enough.
In addition, while the empirical evidence about reunification
programs may be thin, there is some evidence about which
approaches are most effective. Robert Kelly, in his review of
research studies evaluating family reunification programs,
found that several approaches were apt to be more successful
than others. First, he found that a ―managed care‖ approach
that focused on intensive in-home services was most likely to be
successful.126 Second, he found that concrete services, such as
―emergency cash, housing, medical care, food, transportation,
assistance with gaining employment, and/or assistance with
securing public assistance‖ were associated with success,
especially with very low-income families.127 He also found that
more lengthy treatment programs with well-trained and
experienced staff tended to be successful.128
Fred Wulczyn, in his article about reunification services
stressed that because studies of reunification services are
limited, professionals in this area must rely more on observation
about what works than empirical evidence.129 However, he
noted that such observation demonstrates that there are several
―promising practices‖ in reunification services.130 These include
126

Kelly, supra note 12, at 378-79.

127

Id. at 380.

128

Id. at 382-84.
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See Wulczyn, supra note 117, at 108.

130

Id. at 108.

136

Fall 2009

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 7:1

―strengths-based family services,‖ intensive family visitation,
developmental awareness, ongoing aftercare and cultural
sensitivity.131 He also noted that research establishes that
comprehensive and theory based interventions that involve
―thoughtful implementation of comprehensive and holistic
approaches to addressing the needs of family and children in
foster care can have positive effects.‖132 Certainly appellate
judges charged with having to assess the reasonableness of a
state agency‘s efforts could benefit from at least possessing
knowledge of these observations.
The potential importance of such social science research is
apparent when reviewing one easily isolated reunification
service—visitation.
The importance of visitation between
natural parents and children placed in foster care has repeatedly
been noted as crucial to reunification.133 In addition, the quality
of visitation is related to success. Child welfare agencies often
limit visitation to one-hour or ninety minutes in a cramped
room at a social services agency. During these visits, the parent
might have to tend to the needs of multiple children of different
ages under the eye of a social worker who is recording his or her
observations. Research shows, however, that reunification is far
more likely when visitation occurs at the foster home where the
parent can engage in normal activities such as putting them to
bed or feeding them a meal.134 Given this evidence, an appellate
judge should question whether the child protection agency that
offers only visits in an office setting is truly exercising
reasonable efforts.
In addition, it is crucially important for appellate judges to
be aware of the research involving the importance of providing

131

Id. at 108-09.

132

Id. at 109.

See, e.g., U.S. DEP‘T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILDREN‘S
BUREAU: CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, FAMILY REUNIFICATION: WHAT
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS (2006), available at
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue_briefs/family_reunification/index.cf
m; Margaret Beyer, Too Little, Too Late: Designing Family Support to Succeed,
22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 311, 336-37 (1996).
133

134

Beyer, supra note 133, at 338.
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―culturally competent‖ reunification services.135
Culturally
competent services are those that ―have the capacity to . . .
respond to the unique needs of populations whose cultures are
different than that which might be called dominant or
mainstream American.‖136 Culturally sensitive reunification
services are vital given the over-representation of certain
cultural groups in the nation‘s child protection system.137
Appellate judges must be sensitive to the need to tailor services
to parents who may be outside the mainstream culture and face
difficulties related to language barriers and cultural
expectations. 138
In short, in view of even this limited research, judges should
be reviewing child welfare agencies‘ efforts with a view to
whether they are providing concrete and comprehensive
services rather than the scattershot menu of services so often
seen in service plans. Indeed, without such review, the tendency
of agencies can be to develop service plans only loosely
connected with the needs of a family. 139
135 It is beyond the purview of this article to extensively examine the need
for culturally competent services, but it is imperative for any professional
involved in the child protection system to be aware of this concern. At least one
state, Minnesota, requires that services be delivered in a culturally competent
way. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
136 Terry Cross, Developing a Knowledge Base to Support Cultural
Competence, 14 FAM. RESOURCE COALITION REP. 2, 3-4 (1995-96).
137 According to one 2008 article, African-American children comprise less
than one-half of the nation‘s children, but more than one-fifth of the foster care
population. See Clement supra note 10, at 413 (noting that African-American
children in the child welfare system are more likely to be removed from their
homes than white children). In addition, Latino and Native Americans make up
a disproportionate number of children in the foster care system. See also
Naomi R. Cahn, Children‘s Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster
Care, and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189, 1198-99 (1999).
138

Cahn, supra note 137, at 1212.

I have often been dismayed by the cookie cutter approach to
reunification efforts contained in some of the service plans for my appellate
clients. For instance, at times parents who have never shown signs of a drug
problem must engage in random drug screens or parents must attend anger
management groups that have not been evaluated for their effectiveness. Beyer
has also criticized this approach at length, illustrating that it can do more harm
than good. She provides an example of a highly typical component of a service
139
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Judges may well be reluctant to question the clinical
decisions of a child welfare agency, which after all, presumably
will have some expertise on the issues before it. However, it
seems entirely reasonable that judges should be provided with
research about the most successful means of reunification when
they are charged with assessing whether a child welfare agency
has fulfilled its legal obligations in this regard. It would not
seem a difficult matter to use some of the money set aside for
states to effect reunification efforts to keep judges educated and
updated on available information. If this were to happen, judges
faced with seemingly perfunctory or mechanical service plans
might be more apt to challenge child welfare agencies to do
better by declining to rule that the reasonable efforts
requirement has been satisfied.

C. DECOUPLING THE REASONABLE EFFORTS REQUIREMENT
FROM THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
DETERMINATION
Another, perhaps more radical approach to dealing with the
reasonable efforts problem, is to rethink the rationale for
making reasonable efforts a precondition for the termination of
parental rights (―TPR‖) and freeing children for adoption.
Nothing in the ASFA requires states to make reasonable efforts a
condition precedent to terminating parental rights.140
Moreover, the constitutional standards governing TPR require
only that a court find by clear and convincing evidence that a
plan: ―Ms. Lawrence must attend parenting skills class.‖ Beyer, supra note 133,
at 314-15. As Beyer notes, this component of the service plan does not examine
the needs of the hypothetical Ms. Lawrence. If it did, it might note that while
Ms. Lawrence loves her children, she often has difficulty coping with their needs
for long periods of time and loses control of herself. This diagnosis indicates
that Ms. Lawrence does not necessarily need parenting classes to help cope with
her anger. She may instead need the services of a babysitter to give her an
occasional break. The author also notes a further problem with this service
plan; it is not logically connected to her needs. The consequences of this can be
disastrous, because as Beyer notes, if Ms. Lawrence becomes defensive and does
not attend parenting classes she may be accused of not caring for her children.
Id. at 315. In such an instance, the service plan might actually act to impede,
not encourage reunification. Certainly, such plans do not constitute a
―reasonable effort‖ to reunify.
140

See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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parent is unfit and that termination is in the child‘s best
interests.141 Nonetheless, approximately one half of the states
have statutes requiring the state to show reasonable efforts
before a parent‘s rights can be terminated and the child freed for
adoption.142 Moreover, even in states where reasonable efforts
are not explicitly a precondition to termination, statutes can
implicitly create such a requirement.143 In short, although
neither Congress nor the constitution requires it, most states
have assumed that child welfare agencies must make reasonable
efforts before a parent‘s rights can be terminated.
The drawbacks of this approach are apparent from the cases
outlined in Part II above in which children were deprived of
permanency because of the state‘s failure to offer sufficient
services to the parents during their time in foster care. Indeed,
to many reasonable people the prospect of a vulnerable child
being left to drift in foster care because of the combined failings
of a child welfare bureaucracy and abusive or neglectful parents
is simply intolerable. Given this, one must wonder why states
have preconditioned permanency for their abused and neglected
children on reasonable efforts.
Perhaps the most logical explanation is that there is an
assumption that if reasonable efforts are not a precondition to
termination, there would be no way to enforce the requirement
at all. In essence, making termination dependent on reasonable
efforts can be likened to the exclusionary rule in criminal law.
The exclusionary rule has long been assumed to act as a
deterrent; that is, police officers, faced with the opportunity to
cut legal corners presumably do not because they know the

141

See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).

142

Kim, supra note 26, at 304.

See David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement
in Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the
Failures of the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 139, 178 (1992).
Massachusetts is one such state. Its termination statute contains fourteen nonexclusive factors for the court to consider when deciding to terminate parental
rights. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(c)(i)-(xiv) (2008). Four of these factors
require the court to consider whether the parents were offered or received
services to correct the problem but refused or were unable to productively
utilize the services on a consistent basis. Id. § 3(c)(ii)-(vi).
143
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evidence they will obtain under those circumstances cannot be
used to convict a criminal. Similarly, child welfare workers who
are tempted to cut corners in providing services to parents will
likely be deterred if they know that the children they are
working with cannot be freed for adoption until they fulfill their
obligation.
Whatever the merits of this logic, it seems both a draconian
and ineffective approach to dealing with the problem. If the
reasonable efforts requirement is strictly enforced, it places the
biggest burden of failure, not on the shoulders of negligent
parents and lethargic or overwhelmed caseworkers, but on
victimized children, effectively victimizing the children again.
When judges strive to avoid this result, the requirement can be
so watered down as to lose meaning.144 Thus, the irony is that
making TPR dependent on satisfying the reasonable efforts
requirement imposes no deterrent effect on lax caseworkers and
agencies whatsoever. When these parties can reliably predict
that the reasonable efforts requirement will receive lenient
treatment, families that might be reunited if reasonable efforts
were employed do not receive the services they need. Given this
perverse result, it would behoove states to consider decoupling
the reasonable efforts determination from the decision about
termination of parental rights. However, at the same time,
states should add provisions to their laws that would encourage
the delivery of services to needy families as intended by the
federal legislation in the first place.
One possible approach is to remove reasonable efforts as a
condition precedent to termination while at the same time
requiring more judicial scrutiny of reasonable efforts at earlier
stages of a child welfare case. As one author notes, there are
usually multiple hearings in a child welfare case prior to a
hearing on termination of parental rights. More vigorous
monitoring of what services are being offered; whether those
services are targeted at the problems the family is experiencing
and whether they are likely to be effective could be done at these
hearings.145
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See supra Part II.A.
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See Herring, supra note 141, at 203-04.
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Such an approach is essentially consistent with the ASFA
which requires a judicial assessment of reasonable efforts at the
point a child is removed from the home and then to establish
that the state has made efforts to allow the child to return
home.146 While the ASFA does not require assessments at each
stage of child protection legislation, its requirements provide a
floor, not a ceiling. States are free to require reasonable efforts
at as many junctures of a child welfare case as they choose.147
This approach may indeed be more effective in enforcing the
reasonable efforts requirement than to pair it with the decision
on TPR. Certainly, stricter monitoring of whether a family is
receiving effective services at an early stage of a child welfare
case can be far more helpful in either salvaging the family or
moving forward to permanency than a post-hoc determination
of reasonable efforts at the termination stage.148
In addition, states, by statute or common-law, could require
more exacting scrutiny of reasonable efforts from judges.
Currently, often the only documentation a judge makes with
regard to reasonable efforts is to check off a box on a pre-printed
form.149 Check-off formats such as this not only permit casual
assessments of reasonable efforts, they may in fact encourage
them. To combat this, states could impose a requirement that
judges make detailed, written findings with regard to reasonable

See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
146

147 At least two states, California and Ohio, require by statute that the court
make a reasonable efforts assessment at each stage of the court process. Alice C.
Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Ten
Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 223, 226-27 (1990).

One commentator notes that in his experience practicing in the child
welfare area in Pennsylvania, few judges assess reasonable efforts before the
termination stage. See Herring, supra note 141, at 194 n.161. Herring notes that
―Only when TPR procedures roll around do the courts take the reasonable
efforts requirement seriously. . . . At this point, rehabilitation is usually
hopeless and requiring the agency to make reasonable efforts at this late date
merely punishes the child for the agency‘s failure.‖ Id.
148
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See Crossley, supra note 2, at 285; Herring supra note 143, at 153-54.
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efforts at each stage of the litigation.150 Judges are surely
familiar with mandate; because of the high evidentiary burden
in TPR cases they are required to make detailed findings of facts
and conclusions of law to support their decisions.151
Requiring judges to make detailed findings at early stages in
the litigation has clear advantages. The child protection agency
would have an early and clear message about whether the court
believes it is fulfilling its legal obligations and if not, what more
needs to be done. This information would be delivered in time
for the agency to implement the judge‘s findings before deciding
that efforts are hopeless and a TPR petition is necessary.
Moreover, the approach has benefits even if not employed in
stages of a case before the TPR hearing, and even when the state
statute does not require reasonable efforts as a condition
precedent to TPR. The judge could still make detailed findings
of fact that would outline specifically why the reasonable efforts
requirement was not satisfied. Although a negative finding
would not derail the petition, the child protection agency would
at least have guidance on whether it met its obligations and
could adjust its methods accordingly in future cases.
Moreover, judges could use additional weapons if faced with
repeated failures to exercise reasonable efforts. For instance,
they could hold an agency in contempt or impose a fine. 152
While judges may be reluctant to impose sanctions on an
overburdened, underfunded agency assigned to protect
vulnerable children, most would find it more palatable than
denying a child a permanent home because the reasonable
efforts requirement has not been satisfied.
In short, states are not required to link the reasonable efforts
requirement to TPR. Instead they seem to be driven to do so by
an intuitive sense that the only way to enforce the requirement

150 Minnesota‘s reasonable efforts statute requires that judges make
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of reasonable efforts. See
supra note 89 and accompanying text.
151 See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 389 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Mass. 1976) (holding
that given the constitutional concerns implicated when terminating parental
rights, judges must make ―specific and detailed findings demonstrating that
close attention has been given to the evidence‖).
152

See Herring, supra note 141, at 204.
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is to do so. Given that alternatives not only seem to be available,
but might actually be more effective in delivering reasonable
efforts, states should explore changing their statutes to separate
the reasonable efforts requirement from TPR determinations.
The ironic and welcome consequence of such action might well
be overall better enforcement of the reasonable efforts
requirement.

IV. CONCLUSION
There are no perfect solutions to the dilemma posed by the
reasonable efforts requirement. It is almost certainly a good
thing to require agencies that remove children from their
families to make realistic attempts to return them at the earliest
possible date. Nonetheless, failures will inevitably occur and
courts will repeatedly be faced with instances where the state
has not met its legal obligation in this regard.
Courts have sometimes addressed this failure by requiring a
―do-over‖ and requiring states to reinitiate its attempts to
reunite children with their families. The drawbacks of this
approach are so clear, and so potentially damaging to children,
that courts have on many occasions instead glossed over the
legal requirement of reasonable efforts.
The child protection system, faced with this problem must
pursue at least the best inadequate solution that it can. The
approaches outlined in this article—giving social services clear
guidelines on what is expected of them; constantly monitoring
social services research to determine what is most likely to help
troubled families; providing judicial scrutiny of whether
agencies are meeting their obligations at early rather than late
stages; and imposing sanctions least likely to affect already
victimized children—hold promise in making incremental
change.
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